مبادئ مظاهرة النظام التجاري الموسعة

مبادئ المظاهرة الموسعة لنظام التداول
(مختصر من ميركوري ليفربول).
وكانت واحدة من أعظم، إن لم يكن أكبر مظاهرة علنية من أي وقت مضى في ليفربول لصالح مبادئ التجارة الحرة، أدلى مساء يوم الأربعاء الماضي، بمناسبة الاجتماع الشهري المنتظم للرابطة مكافحة الاحتكار ليفربول. وقد أعلن الاجتماع لأول مرة أن يعقد كالمعتاد في قاعة الموسيقى، ولكن بعد أن تم التأكد من أن العضو المنتخب حديثا لدورهام، جون برايت، إسك، سيكون حاضرا، والمدرج الملكي تشارك. قبل وقت طويل من افتتاح أبواب المسرح، كان الشارع المقابل للمنزل مزدحما بكثافة من قبل الأشخاص الذين يتوقون للحصول على القبول، وبعد فترة وجيزة من طرح الأبواب فتح الحفرة والمعرض، والتي كان القبول مجانا، كانت معبأة تماما في كل ركن مع الأفراد. الصناديق، التي كانت مخصصة أساسا للسيدات، والتي كان هناك رسوم من سيكسينس للقبول، كانت مليئة تماما، ولكن ليس مزدحمة بشكل غير مريح. كانت المرحلة مكتظة، على الرغم من أن هناك أيضا تهمة سيكسينس للقبول في هذا الجزء من المنزل. لم يكن لدينا الكثير لدينا لرؤية اجتماع أكثر عددا أو أكثر حماسا. واضطر الآلاف إلى الذهاب بعيدا دون الحصول على القبول، على الرغم من أن كل زاوية المتاحة من المبنى الرخوي شغلت. حتى من فتحة التهوية في وسط السقف كان هناك عدد من الأفراد ليتم رؤيتهم على التجمعات المتحركة والمزدحمة كثيفة أدناه. وقد تم تجهيز المسرح بشكل مناسب مع لافتات، بانر، وأجهزة التجارة الحرة.
حوالي الساعة السابعة وسبعة الماضية وليام راثبون، إزك.، دخل المنزل، و تلقى مع الهتاف الأكثر حماسا. وتبعه بعد ذلك بوقت قصير جون برايت، إسك، م. ب.، الذي رحب بتصفيق صمود. وبمجرد هدوء الهتاف، اقترح جيمس ميلور، إيسك، أن يتولى وليام راثبون، إيسك، الرئاسة، التي أعيرها لورانس هيورث، إسك، وحمل بالتزكية.
وألقى الرئيس، الذي تلقى ترحيبا حارا، كلمة أمام الاجتماع، وبعدها اقترح السيد جون سميث، في خطاب فعال، القرار الأول الذي كان كما يلي:
"هذا، كما أن المعاناة التي عاشتها جميع فئات المجتمع منذ فترة طويلة، والصبر المثالي الذي تم تحمله، قد اعترف تماما من قبل وزراء جلالة الملكة، فإن هذا الاجتماع يرغب في تسجيل استياءهم الشديد الذي سمح لجلسة أخرى للبرلمان بإغلاقها دون محاولة واحدة لتطبيق سبيل انتصاف؛ وهذا الاستياء يتفاقم بسبب معرفة أن هذا الإهمال المذنب لجميع التشريعات العادلة ليس له ذريعة الجهل من جهة، ولا رغبة السلطة من جهة أخرى؛ ولكن مع الإقرار الدائم بحقيقة مبادئ التجارة الحرة، وحيازة أغلبية كبيرة في مجلسي البرلمان، لا يزال وزراء جلالتها يواصلون التضحية بالازدهار الوطني إلى نظام أناني، ولكن قصر النظر، الاحتكار ".
وأيد السيد جيمس مولينو القرار، الذي وضعه الرئيس آنذاك، وحققت حرفيا غابة من الأيدي لصالحها. لم يتم تمديد أحد في المعارضة، وأعلن أنه تم تمرير بالإجماع.
اعتبر ريتشارد شيل، إيسك، نفسه محظوظا بشكل خاص في الحاجة إلى اقتراح قرار لا يحتاج إلى توصية منه، والتي لا تحتاج إلا إلى قراءة لضمان اعتماده. كان:-
"أن رابطة مكافحة الذرة الذرة، من خلال مجهوداتهم النشطة وغير المبتذلة في إثبات للمجتمع عموما، وخاصة للزراعين، شرور ما يسمى نظام الحماية، وقد اكتسبت جيدا امتنان مواطنيهم. ويشهد هذا الاجتماع على إشباعهم الكبير في تكريمه بحضور جون برايت، عضو متميز في تلك الهيئة، وشكره بأقصى قدر من الجدية على ما بذله من جهود في الماضي، ونبتهج بأن مجاله من الفائدة يوسعه انتخابه المنتصر من مدينة دورهام ".
هذا هو القرار الذي كان عليه أن يقترح، وكل ما توسل هو، أنها سوف تعكس قليلا على ذلك. فقط دعهم ينظرون في ما تأثير انتخاب جون برايت لمدينة دورهام يجب بالضرورة أن يكون على المجتمع ككل، أي التغيير الكبير الذي حدث في تلك المدينة، وهو التغيير الذي ينتشر بسرعة في جميع أنحاء البلاد، التغيير الذي سيضع قريبا ممثلي الشعب في مجلس العموم في الموقف الذي يجب ألا يكونوا قد أزيلوا منه. (هتافات صاخبة.)
وأعرب كريستوفر روون، إيسك، عن خالص تمنياته بأنه يمكن أن يضيف أي شيء في طريق الجدة أو القوة إلى الحجج المقدمة لصالح القضية التي تم تجميعها لدعمها، ولكن كما أنه لا يستطيع أن يفعل ذلك، وقال انه سوف يتطابق مع وأعزوا القرار بحذر.
ثم وضع الرئيس القرار، وأعلن أنه سيجري بالإجماع. وقال رجل بالقرب من الكرسي انه يعتقد انه رأى يد واحدة عقدت ضده، طرح الرئيس هذا السؤال مرة أخرى، ولكن المخلة الانفرادي وهمي لم تظهر في كل تجمع هائل.
جون برايت، إسك.، M. P.، ثم ارتفع، وكان استقباله أكثر حماسا. عندما هبطت جولات الهتاف المتكررة، خاطب الجمهور بأسلوبه البارع والرائع، مع التركيز بشكل كبير على مواضيع مماثلة لتلك التي حث عليها في العدد الأولي للاقتصاد، لمس السكر والبن والصوف، و ج. ، ثم تناول نفسه إلى مسألة آراء دائرة ليفربول. كان يعرف أن 10 لتر. وكان أصحاب المنازل في ليفربول لصالح التجارة الحرة. (سمع، سمع). وقال انه لن يلقي خطابا عن السياسة الحزب - وقال انه لن يقول كلمة من أي رجل كممثل لأي دائرة أيا كان، على أي حال مهما كان، إلا كونها ل أو ضد التجارة الحرة. 10 لتر. سيعلن أصحاب المنازل في ليفربول تأييدهم للتجارة الحرة إذا جرت الانتخابات صباح غد. (الهتاف العظيم). ولكن قد تم تسليم أحياءهم، وربط اليد والقدم، إلى المحتكرين، من قبل هذا الجزء من الناخبين الذين هم أنفسهم أعظم الذين يعانون من هذا النظام - الرجال الذين كانوا أول سحق من قبل، والذين في أشد المعاناة ما لم يلغ هذا النظام. (سمع، سمع.) كان له الحق في التحدث إلى الرجال. كان يكاد يكون يقول إنه لم يدع إلى الجلوس في البرلمان، إلا كممثل للعمال الحرين والطبقات العاملة في مدينة دورهام. (الهتاف العظيم.) كان قد مسح لهم مرارا وتكرارا، ومرة ​​أخرى. لقد كان يطلب منهم دائما التصويت إما للأحمر أو للأزرق، وقال انه يعتقد أنه كان لون آخر، - أن كان قد صوت دائما إما ويغ أو توري دون أن يعتقد أنه كان من أي نوع من النتائج بالنسبة لهم ما نوع من الآراء التي عقدت من قبل واحد أو آخر. لكنه كان قد جلس معهم في منازلهم؛ رأى منهم يأخذون وجبة الإفطار والشاي. وأظهر لهم كيف احتكار سلب لهم من القهوة والسكر، والخبز والزبدة لأطفالهم. وأوضح لهم كيف عانى من البنادق، وصانعي الأحذية، والنجارين، وكل نوع من الحرفيين إذا كانت التجارة في البلاد مقيدة؛ وأوضح لهم أنه إذا زادت أسرهم، وإذا زاد عدد السكان، ولم تتزايد التجارة، فإن أولئك الذين ليس لديهم ممتلكات ولكن عملهم، الذي يجب أن يكون العمل أو يجب أن يموت جوعا، وأظهر لهم كيف أن المنافسة الشرسة على العمل وبالتالي خلق خفض معدل الأجور؛ وأظهر لهم أن خاطئة الاحتكار وقفت، وكان قد دعا إلى وجود من قبل قانون انكلترا، - القانون الذي كانوا من خلال سلوكهم في الانتخابات السابقة قد ساعدت على جعل، - وهو أثبت لهم أن فيند محروم وثلثهم ثلث أو نصف بقايا الأجور البائسة التي حصلوا عليها. ولم يسبق لهم أن أدلىوا ببيان واحد في تلك الانتخابات؛ لم يتم استخدام الكلمات ويغ و توري أبدا؛ وتحدثوا عن حرية التجارة في حقوق الصناعة، وخداع الفقراء تحت حافر الاحتكار؛ لم يكن هناك مصلحة شريرة هناك، لا يوجد احتكار في الهند الغربية هناك - كان عملهم يعتمد فقط؛ كانوا رجالا صادعين ولديهم ذكاء، وعندما استدعوا ذكائهم وتعاطفهم، لم يكن من الممكن لجميع الترهيب، كل تأثير الأغنياء والأقوياء، لمنعهم من التصويت لرجل منهم لا يعرف شيئا باستثناء متصلة مع رابطة مكافحة الذرة القانون، وداعيا لإلغاء جميع الاحتكارات. (هتاف عظيم). وتمنى أن جميع حراس ليفربول كانوا حاضرين في ذلك الاجتماع. وقال انه سيبقى حتى اثني عشر ساعة في الليل ناي، وقال انه سيبقى حتى اثني عشر ساعة إلى الغد ليلة لمناقشة معهم جميع النقاط المرتبطة هذا السؤال الكبير. وتمنى له أن يكون لهزة واحدة من اليد مع الجسم كله من فريمن من ليفربول. لم يكن هناك فئة من الناس الذين كان لديه تعاطف صادق جدا بالنسبة لأولئك الذين يعيشون من قبل عملهم، مع العلم جيدا أن آثار القوانين السيئة يجب أن تأتي في كل كوخ، وأن القوانين الجيدة سوف ترسل بعض أشعة الشمس وبعض الراحة لكل كوخ وكل قلب في الأرض. (هتاف كبير). لم يكن هناك علاج للضيق القائم بين الطبقات العاملة ولكن إلغاء تلك القوانين التي تقيد تجارتها والتي تتسبب في تزايد السكان إلى تقييد العمالة وعدم كفاية إمدادات الغذاء. في انتخابات أخرى، دعاهم إلى التفكير في أي حزب آخر، الذي كان مجرد عظمة بائسة من الخلاف ألقيت بينهم لتشتيت انتباههم، في حين شخص آخر كان يهرب مع كل ما كان يستحق التنافس. وأعرب عن سروره لرؤية أن الدورة الأخيرة قد دمرت الالتزام بالأحزاب في البرلمان. وقد وجدت الوزارة أنه من خلال التقيد الصارم بحزبهم لا يمكنهم أن يفعلوا شيئا للشعب: فمن جهة وجدوا أنه إذا حاولوا أن يفعلوا الكثير من أجل الشعب، فإن حزبهم سوف يتخلى عنهم، من جهة أخرى، أنه إذا التمسك بدقة لأحزاب الأجسام التي لا يمكن أن تصمد أمام معارضة الشعب. حزب ويغ تجرأ على عدم مسيرة مع مبادئها. فقد كانت المعارضة الأكثر عديمة القوة التي واجهت حكومة من أي وقت مضى؛ كانوا يعرفون ما يريده الناس. ولكن بطريقة أو بأخرى كان هناك التشبث بالتحيزات الأرستقراطية؛ وقال (السيد برايت) للشعب أن لديهم لا أحد يعتمد عليها ولكن أنفسهم. (اسمع، سماع.) أقول له أن ويغ أو توري، أو أي الأرستقراطية الأخرى يمكن انقاذ انكلترا! كانت حكاية أحمق. يجب أن يأتي خلاصهم من أنفسهم، ويجب أن يأتي منهم في كشك الاقتراع. (هتاف متحمس.) كان هناك طريقتين فقط، - واحدة من قبل السيف، والآخر بالتصويت. لم يكن له علاقة بالسيف. أخذ السيف بعيدا. قد تنقذ الدولة بدونها. ولكن دعهم يفكرون في أصواتهم؛ كان التصويت من الرجل العامل جيدة مثل الرجل الذي يملك مقاطعة. (اسمع، سمع.) دعونا لا الرجل العامل يعتقد نفسه مجرد ذرة في الجهاز السياسي. صوته قد يحول الانتخابات ل ليفربول، والتصويت واحد ل ليفربول قد تدمر إلى الأبد هذا القانون الذرة البغيضة. (الهتاف العظيم). عندما كان يعتقد ما ليفربول كان، ما إذا كان سيتم إلغاء هذا القانون، وقال انه كان حريصا أن تلك الليلة لا ينبغي أن يموت بعيدا دون إحداث بعض التأثير. عندما فكر في النبلاء، والنهر إكولتينغ، ورأى في ذلك مصدرا للازدهار الكبير والمتزايدة. صديق من يساره هذا النهر في الرابع من هذا الشهر، وفي خمسة وعشرين يوما كان لديه رسالة منه من هاليفاكس، نوفا سكوتيا؛ في ست ساعات يستطيعون السفر من لندن إلى بولوغن؛ وهل كان من المتسامح معه، أن الناس الذين يمكن أن تؤثر مثل هذه العجائب كما ينبغي أن تقدم أي أطول إلى هذا النظام إمبسيلي كما أن الاحتكار؟ (هتافات صاخبة). لا يتحدث عن استمرار مثل هذا النظام الصبياني والشرير، وهو نظام لم يكن هناك موازية في أي عصر أو أمة. (استمرار الهتاف). شعب مصر، الذي بني الأهرامات أن تستمر حتى نهاية الوقت، وكان شعب جاهل جدا و إمبسيلي للعبادة القرود: لماذا شعب ليفربول تحمل بعض التشابه لشعب مصر في ذلك. (الكثير من الضحك والهتاف.) إذا كان من سكان ليفربول يجب أن يخجل من الاعتراف في البلدان الأجنبية أنه ينتمي إليها، لشعب ليفربول فعل شيئا سخيفا كما عبادة القرود. لقد فعلوا أشياء لتحملها من أجل الأعمار، وقد قاد العالم في العديد من مهنة كبيرة، ومع ذلك أنها انحنى إلى هذا احتكار مخلوق بائسة، مقارنة مع الذي كان قرد المصريين في الواقع إله. (هتاف كبير). وسألهم نيابة عن شعب روشديل، الذين أرسلوا منتجاتهم من خلال ميناء ليفربول، الذين استوردوا القطن والصوف من خلال ميناء ليفربول، وطلب منهم، نيابة عن هذا السكان المجتهد ، من بينهم كان يعيش، للتصويت من أجل إلغاء قوانين الذرة؛ ونيابة عن تلك الدائرة الانتخابية التي كلفته بتمثيل مدينتهم، لأنه جاء بلا خوف من بينهم للدعوة إلى إلغاء جميع الاحتكارات نيابة عنهم، وبالنيابة عن الشعب المعاناة في هذا البلد، وبالنيابة عن والمبادئ العظيمة للعدالة والإنسانية في جميع أنحاء العالم، وبالنيابة عن تلك المسيحية التي أعلنوا أنها مستعدة لتقديم بعض التضحيات، دعوتهم للتفكير في هذه المسألة، وبعد أن فكر فيها لاتخاذ قرار، و وإعطاء أصواتهم وأصواتهم لصالح إلغاء أسوأ قانون أن أي هيئة تشريعية بشرية مرت على الإطلاق إلى البؤس ومأساة أي شعب. استأنف جنتلمان مقعده وسط أقوال متحمسة وطويلة، بعد أن تكلم بالضبط ساعة وعشرين دقيقة.
وقال الرئيس إنه بعد ما سمعوه، وقد سمعوا قدرا كبيرا، كان الشيء التالي هو الذهاب وتذكر ما سمعوا، والعمل على ذلك. وقد حل الاجتماع الآن، وكان يشعر بالفخر في رؤية مثل هذا التجمع كما كان أمامه في ذلك المساء؛ واحدة من تلك التي أجريت بشكل جيد، وخالية من أي من تلك التصفيق فخ التي كانت في كثير من الأحيان تمزج. وأعرب عن ثقته بأنهم سيتذكرون ما سمعوه ويتصرفون عليه.
وبعد ذلك، قام السيد تشارلز إدوارد رولينز، جون، بتوجيه الشكر إلى الرئيس، الذي تم عرضه على الاجتماع وحمله.
وأعاد الرئيس بإيجاز الشكر على الشرف الممنوح له، وأعرب عن أمله في أن يظهروا شعب ليفربول، ليس فقط بالكلمة، بل بالأفعال، التي من شأنها أن تخبر الجيل القادم وبالأطفال الذين لم يولدوا بعد.
ثلاثة الهتافات التي أعطيت للسيد كوبدان، ونفس الشيء بالنسبة للسيد برايت، وفصل الاجتماع في ربع إلى 10 ساعة.

نظام الاتحاد الأوروبي لتجارة الانبعاثات (الاتحاد الأوروبي إتس)
وأوضح نظام الاتحاد الأوروبي لتجارة الانبعاثات.
ويعد نظام االتحاد األوروبي لتداول االنبعاثات) إيتس (حجر الزاوية في سياسة االتحاد األوروبي لمكافحة تغير المناخ وأداة رئيسية للحد من انبعاثات غازات الدفيئة من حيث التكلفة. هذا هو أول سوق الكربون الرئيسي في العالم ولا يزال أكبر واحد.
تعمل في 31 دولة (جميع دول الاتحاد الأوروبي البالغ عددها 28 دولة بالإضافة إلى أيسلندا وليختنشتاين والنرويج) تحد من الانبعاثات من أكثر من 11،000 منشأة تستخدم الطاقة الثقيلة (محطات توليد الكهرباء والمنشآت الصناعية) وتغطي شركات الطيران العاملة بين هذه البلدان حوالي 45٪ من غازات الدفيئة في الاتحاد الأوروبي الانبعاثات.
للحصول على نظرة عامة مفصلة، ​​انظر:
A 'كاب والتجارة' النظام.
تعمل إتس الاتحاد الأوروبي على مبدأ "الحد والتجارة".
يتم تحديد سقف على إجمالي كمية غازات الدفيئة معينة التي يمكن أن تنبعث من المنشآت التي يغطيها النظام. ويتم تخفيض الحد الأقصى بمرور الوقت بحيث ينخفض ​​إجمالي الانبعاثات.
وفي إطار الحد الأقصى، تتلقى الشركات أو تشتري بدلات الانبعاثات التي يمكن أن تتاجر بها مع بعضها البعض حسب الحاجة. ويمكنهم أيضا شراء كميات محدودة من القروض الدولية من مشاريع إنقاذ الانبعاثات في جميع أنحاء العالم. ويضمن الحد الأقصى لعدد البدلات المتاحة أن يكون لها قيمة.
وبعد كل سنة، يجب على الشركة أن تسلم ما يكفي من البدلات لتغطية جميع انبعاثاتها، وإلا فرضت غرامات كبيرة. وإذا خفضت الشركة انبعاثاتها، فإنها يمكن أن تحتفظ بدلات احتياطية لتغطية احتياجاتها المستقبلية أو أن تبيعها إلى شركة أخرى تقل عن المخصصات.
فالتجارة تجلب المرونة التي تضمن خفض الانبعاثات حيث تكلف أقل من ذلك. كما يعزز سعر الكربون القوي الاستثمار في التكنولوجيات النظيفة والمنخفضة الكربون.
الملامح الرئيسية للمرحلة 3 (2018-2020)
وقد أصبح الاتحاد الأوروبي للاتصالات الأوروبية الآن في مرحلته الثالثة - يختلف كثيرا عن المرحلتين 1 و 2.
التغييرات الرئيسية هي:
يتم تطبيق سقف واحد على مستوى الاتحاد الأوروبي على الانبعاثات بدلا من النظام السابق للقبعات الوطنية يعتبر المزاد هو الطريقة الافتراضية لتخصيص البدلات (بدلا من التخصيص المجاني)، وتنطبق قواعد التوزيع المنسقة على البدلات التي لا تزال تمنح مجانا. تضمنت الغازات 300 مليون بدلات خصصت في احتياطي المشردين الجدد لتمويل نشر تكنولوجيات مبتكرة للطاقة المتجددة واحتجاز الكربون وتخزينه من خلال برنامج 300 نر.
القطاعات والغازات المشمولة.
ويغطي النظام القطاعات والغازات التالية مع التركيز على الانبعاثات التي يمكن قياسها والإبلاغ عنها والتحقق منها بمستوى عال من الدقة:
من ثاني أكسيد الكربون (CO2) من قطاعات توليد الطاقة والطاقة الحرارية كثيفة الاستخدام للطاقة بما في ذلك مصافي النفط والأعمال الحديدية وإنتاج الحديد والألمنيوم والمعادن والاسمنت والجير والزجاج والسيراميك ولب الورق والورق والكرتون والأحماض والمواد الكيميائية العضوية السائبة أكسيد النيتروز التجاري (N 2 O) من إنتاج أحماض النيتريك والأديبيك والجليوكسيليك ومركبات الكربون الهيدروكلورية فلورية غليوكسال (بكس) من إنتاج الألومنيوم.
المشاركة في إتس الاتحاد الأوروبي إلزامية للشركات في هذه القطاعات، ولكن.
في بعض القطاعات فقط النباتات فوق حجم معين يتم تضمين بعض المنشآت الصغيرة يمكن استبعادها إذا وضعت الحكومات تدابير مالية أو غيرها من شأنها أن خفض انبعاثاتها من قبل ما يعادلها في قطاع الطيران، حتى عام 2018 ينطبق إتس الاتحاد الأوروبي فقط على الرحلات الجوية بين المطارات الواقعة في المنطقة الاقتصادية الأوروبية (إيا).
تقديم تخفيضات في الانبعاثات.
وقد أثبتت إتس الاتحاد الأوروبي أن وضع سعر على الكربون والتداول في ذلك يمكن أن تعمل. وتنخفض الانبعاثات من المنشآت في المخطط حسب الغرض - بنحو 5٪ مقارنة مع بداية المرحلة 3 (2018) (انظر أرقام 2018).
وفي عام 2020، ستكون الانبعاثات من القطاعات التي يغطيها النظام أقل بنسبة 21 في المائة عما كانت عليه في عام 2005.
تطوير سوق الكربون.
أنشئت في عام 2005، والاتحاد الأوروبي إتس هو أول وأكبر نظام دولي للانبعاثات الانبعاثات في العالم، وهو ما يمثل أكثر من ثلاثة أرباع التجارة الدولية للكربون.
كما تلهم إتس الاتحاد الأوروبي تطوير تجارة الانبعاثات في بلدان ومناطق أخرى. ويهدف الاتحاد الأوروبي إلى ربط إتس الاتحاد الأوروبي مع أنظمة أخرى متوافقة.
التشريعات الرئيسية للاتحاد الأوروبي بشأن التجارة الإلكترونية.
30/04/2018 - نسخة موحدة من التوجيه 2003/87 / إيك للبرلمان الأوروبي والمجلس الذي ينشئ خطة لتداول بدل انبعاث غازات الدفيئة داخل الجماعة وتعديل توجيه المجلس رقم 96/61 / إيك 23/04/2009 - التوجيه رقم 2009/29 / إيك الصادر عن البرلمان الأوروبي والمجلس الأوروبي المعدل للتوجيه 2003/87 / إيك من أجل تحسين وتوسيع نطاق خطة تداول بدل غازات الدفيئة في الجماعة 19/11/2008 - التوجيه 2008/101 / إيك والبرلمان الأوروبي والمجلس الذي يعدل التوجيه 2003/87 / إيك بحيث يشمل أنشطة الطيران في مخطط تداول بدل غازات الدفيئة داخل الجماعة 27/10/2004 - الأمر التوجيهي 2004/101 / إيك الصادر عن البرلمان الأوروبي و المجلس الذي يعدل التوجيه 2003/87 / إيك الذي ينشئ خطة لتداول بدل انبعاث غازات الدفيئة داخل الجماعة فيما يتعلق بآليات مشروع بروتوكول كيوتو 13/10/2003 - الأمر التوجيهي 2003/87 / إيك الصادر عن البرلمان الأوروبي والاتحاد الأوروبي نيل التي تضع مخططا لتداول بدل انبعاث غازات الدفيئة داخل الجماعة وتعديل توجيه المجلس 96/61 / إيك.
تقارير سوق الكربون.
23/11/2017 - كوم (2017) 693 - تقرير عن أداء سوق الكربون الأوروبي 01/02/2017 - كوم (2017) 48 - تقرير عن أداء سوق الكربون الأوروبي 18/11/2018 - كوم 2018) 576 - تقرير عن أداء سوق الكربون الأوروبي 14/11/2018 - كوم (2018) 652 - حالة سوق الكربون الأوروبي في عام 2018.
تنقيح إتس للاتحاد الأوروبي للمرحلة 3.
04/02/2018 - استنتاجات المجلس الأوروبي المؤرخة 4 شباط / فبراير 2018 (انظر الاستنتاجين 23 و 24) 18/03/2018 - إرشادات بشأن تفسير المرفق الأول لتوجيه الاتحاد الأوروبي بشأن التجارة الإلكترونية (باستثناء أنشطة الطيران) 18/03/2018 - إرشادات ورقة تعريفية لمولدات الكهرباء 06/04/2009 - بيان صحفي صادر عن المجلس حول اعتماد مجموعة المناخ والطاقة 12/12/2008 - استنتاجات رئاسة المجلس الأوروبي (11 و 12 ديسمبر 2008) 12/12/2008 - المجلس الأوروبي بيان بشأن استخدام عائدات المزادات 23/01/2008 - اقتراح بتوجيه من البرلمان الأوروبي والمجلس بتعديل التوجيه 2003/87 / إيك من أجل تحسين وتوسيع نظام تداول بدل غازات الدفيئة في المجتمع 23 / 01/2008 - وثيقة عمل موظفي اللجنة - وثيقة مصاحبة للاقتراح الخاص بتوجيه للبرلمان الأوروبي والمجلس المعدل للتوجيه 2003/87 / إيك من أجل تحسين وتوسيع نطاق نظام تداول بدل انبعاثات غازات الاحتباس الحراري في الاتحاد الأوروبي - تقييم الأثر.
التنفيذ.
04/07/2018 - مشروع لائحة تنظيمية بشأن تحديد الاستحقاقات الائتمانية الدولية 05/06/2018 - مشروع لائحة بشأن تحديد استحقاقات الائتمان الدولي 05/05/2018 لائحة المفوضية رقم الاتحاد الأوروبي رقم 389/2018 بتاريخ 2 مايو 2018 بشأن إنشاء السجل الاتحادي إلى التوجيه رقم 2003/87 / إيك الصادر عن البرلمان الأوروبي والمجلس الأوروبي، والمرسومين رقم 280/2004 / إيك رقم 406/2009 / إيك للبرلمان الأوروبي والمجلس الأوروبي، وإلغاء لائحة المفوضية الأوروبية رقم 920/2018 و لا 1193/2018 نص ذو صلة بالمنطقة الاقتصادية الأوروبية 18/11/2018 - لائحة اللجنة التي تنشئ سجل الاتحاد لفترة التداول التي تبدأ في 1 يناير 2018 وفترات التداول اللاحقة من مخطط الإتجار في الانبعاثات بالاتحاد وفقا للتوجيه 2003/87 / إيك والبرلمان الأوروبي والمجلس، والمقرر 280/2004 / إيك الصادر عن البرلمان الأوروبي والمجلس الأوروبي، وتعديل اللائحة التنفيذية رقم 2216/2004 والاتحاد الأوروبي رقم 920/2018 - لم تنشر بعد في الجريدة الرسمية 07 / 10/2018 - كوميسيون ريجول (الاتحاد الأوروبي) رقم 920/2018 لنظام موحد ومضمون للسجلات عملا بالتوجيه 2003/87 / إيك الصادر عن البرلمان الأوروبي والمجلس الأوروبي والقرار رقم 280/2004 / إيك الصادر عن البرلمان الأوروبي والمجلس - بما في ذلك التغييرات التي أدخلتها لائحة 18 نوفمبر 2018 08/10/2008 - لائحة المفوضية (إيك) رقم 994/2008 لنظام موحد ومضمون من السجلات وفقا للتوجيه 2003/87 / إيك للبرلمان الأوروبي والمجلس الأوروبي - القرار رقم 280/2004 / إيك الصادر عن البرلمان الأوروبي والمجلس - الإصدار الساري حتى 31 ديسمبر 2018 26/10/2007 - قرار اللجنة المشتركة للمنطقة الاقتصادية الأوروبية رقم 146/2007 الذي يربط الاتحاد الأوروبي بالإنكليزية إتس مع النرويج وأيسلندا وليختنشتاين 13/11 / 2006 - قرار اللجنة 2006/780 / إيك بشأن تجنب الازدواجية المزدوجة لانبعاثات غازات الدفيئة في إطار خطة الجماعة المعنية بتداول الانبعاثات لأنشطة المشاريع بموجب بروتوكول كيوتو عملا بالتوجيه 2003/87 / إيك الصادر عن البرلمان الأوروبي والمجلس (ن) (2006) 5362) 21/12/2004 - نسخة موحدة من لائحة المفوضية (إيك) رقم 2216/2004 بشأن نظام موحد ومضمون للسجلات معدلة بموجب لائحة المفوضية رقم 916/2007 المؤرخة 31 يوليو / تموز 2007، لائحة المفوضية (إيك) رقم 994/2008 المؤرخة 8 أكتوبر 2008 ولائحة المفوضية (يو) رقم 920/2018 المؤرخة 7 أكتوبر 2018 - نسخة لا تشمل التغييرات التي أدخلتها لائحة 18 نوفمبر 2018.
تطبيق ضريبة القيمة المضافة.
التاريخ التشريعي للتوجيه 2003/87 / إيك.
العمل قبل اقتراح اللجنة.
08/02/2000 - كوم (2000) 87 - ورقة خضراء بشأن الاتجار بانبعاثات غازات الدفيئة في إطار الاتحاد الأوروبي ولاية ونتائج الفريق العامل الأول التابع للجنة إكب: الآليات المرنة 04/09/2001 - المحضر الموجز لاجتماع التشاور مع أصحاب المصلحة (مع الصناعة والمنظمات غير الحكومية البيئية) 19/05/1999 - كوم (1999) 230 - التحضير لتنفيذ بروتوكول كيوتو 03/06/1998 - كوم (1998) 353 - تغير المناخ - نحو استراتيجية ما بعد كيوتو للاتحاد الأوروبي نطاق إتس للاتحاد الأوروبي : 07/2007 - المنشآت الصغيرة داخل الاتحاد الأوروبي نظام تداول الانبعاثات 10/2006 - إدراج أنشطة إضافية والغازات في الاتحاد الأوروبي نظام تداول الانبعاثات مزيد من المواءمة وزيادة القدرة على التنبؤ: 12/2006 - النهج إلى الداخلين الجدد والإغلاق 10/2006 - مزاد بدائل انبعاث ثاني أآسيد الكربون في الاتحاد الأوروبي إتس 10/2006 - مواءمة منهجيات التخصيص 12/2006 - تقرير عن القدرة التنافسية الدولية فريق عمل إكب المعني بتداول الانبعاثات في استعراض إتس للاتحاد الأوروبي 15/06/2007 - التقرير النهائي للمي 4 بشأن الربط مع أنظمة تجارة الانبعاثات في الدول الثالثة 22/05/2007 - التقرير النهائي للاجتماع الثالث حول مزيد من المواءمة وزيادة القدرة على التنبؤ 26/04/2007 - التقرير النهائي للاجتماع الثاني حول الامتثال الصارم وإنفاذ القانون 09/03/2007 - التقرير النهائي للاجتماع الأول بشأن نطاق التوجيه.
أكتوبر 2001.
22/01/2002 - ورقة غير رسمية عن أوجه التآزر بين اقتراح المفوضية الأوروبية بشأن الاتجار بالانبعاثات (كوم (2001) 581) وتوجيه الاتفاقية الدولية لوقاية النباتات 23/10/2001 - كوم (2001) 581 - اقتراح بشأن توجيه إطاري لتداول انبعاثات غازات الدفيئة داخل الجماعة الأوروبية.
رد فعل اللجنة على قراءة الاقتراح في المجلس والبرلمان (بما في ذلك الموقف المشترك للمجلس)
18/07/2003 - كوم (2003) 463 - رأي اللجنة بشأن تعديلات البرلمان الأوروبي على الموقف المشترك للمجلس بشأن اقتراح توجيه البرلمان الأوروبي والمجلس الأوروبي 20/06/2003 - كوم (2003) 364 - الاتصال باللجنة إلى البرلمان الأوروبي بشأن الموقف المشترك للمجلس بشأن اعتماد توجيه يضع مخططا لتداول بدل انبعاثات غازات الدفيئة داخل الجماعة وتعديل توجيه المجلس 96/61 / إيك 18/03/2003 - الموقف المشترك (إيك ) لا 28/2003 - الموقف المشترك للمجلس بشأن اعتماد توجيه يضع مخططا لتداول بدل انبعاثات غازات الدفيئة داخل الجماعة وتعديل توجيه المجلس 96/61 / إيك 27/11/2002 - كوم (2002) 680 - اقتراح معدل لتوجيه من البرلمان الأوروبي والمجلس يضع مخططا لتداول بدل انبعاث غازات الدفيئة داخل الجماعة وتعديل توجيه المجلس 96/61 / إيك فاق.
افتح جميع الأسئلة.
أسئلة وأجوبة بشأن نظام الاتحاد الأوروبي المنقح لتداول الانبعاثات (كانون الأول / ديسمبر 2008)
ما هو الهدف من تداول الانبعاثات؟
والهدف من نظام االتحاد األوروبي لتداول االنبعاثات هو مساعدة الدول األعضاء في االتحاد األوروبي على تحقيق التزاماتها للحد من انبعاثات غازات الدفيئة أو الحد منها بطريقة فعالة من حيث التكلفة. والسماح للشركات المشاركة بشراء أو بيع بدلات الانبعاثات يعني أن التخفيضات في الانبعاثات يمكن أن تتحقق بأقل تكلفة.
إن إتس الاتحاد الأوروبي هو حجر الزاوية في استراتيجية الاتحاد الأوروبي لمكافحة تغير المناخ. وهو أول نظام تجاري دولي لانبعاثات ثاني أكسيد الكربون في العالم، وقد بدأ العمل به منذ عام 2005. واعتبارا من الأول من يناير / كانون الثاني 2008، فإنه لا ينطبق فقط على الدول الأعضاء في الاتحاد الأوروبي البالغ عددها 27 دولة، وإنما ينطبق أيضا على الأعضاء الثلاثة الآخرين في المنطقة الاقتصادية الأوروبية - النرويج وأيسلندا وليختنشتاين. وهي تغطي حاليا أكثر من 000 10 منشأة في قطاعي الطاقة والصناعة وهما مسؤولان جماعيا عن ما يقرب من نصف انبعاثات الاتحاد الأوروبي من ثاني أكسيد الكربون و 40 في المائة من مجموع انبعاثات غازات الدفيئة. وسيؤدي إدخال تعديل على توجيه الاتحاد الأوروبي بشأن التجارة الإلكترونية المتفق عليه في تموز / يوليه 2008 إلى إدراج قطاع الطيران في النظام اعتبارا من عام 2018.
كيف يعمل تداول الانبعاثات؟
و إتس الاتحاد الأوروبي هو نظام "سقف والتجارة"، وهذا يعني أنه يحد من المستوى العام للانبعاثات المسموح بها ولكن، في حدود هذا، يسمح للمشاركين في النظام لشراء وبيع البدلات كما تتطلب. هذه البدلات هي "عملة" التداول المشتركة في قلب النظام. يمنح أحد البدلات لصاحب الحق الحق في انبعاث طن واحد من ثاني أكسيد الكربون أو ما يعادله من غازات الدفيئة الأخرى. ويؤدي الحد الأقصى لعدد البدلات إلى نشوء ندرة في السوق.
وفي فترة التداول الأولى والثانية في إطار هذا المخطط، كان على الدول الأعضاء أن تضع خططا وطنية للتخصيص تحدد المستوى الكلي لانبعاثاتها، وكم عدد البدلات التي تصدرها كل منشأة في بلدها. وفي نهاية كل سنة يجب أن تسلم المنشآت بدلات تعادل انبعاثاتها. ويمكن للشركات التي تبقي انبعاثاتها دون مستوى بدلاتها أن تبيع بدلاتها الزائدة. ويواجه أولئك الذين يواجهون صعوبة في الحفاظ على انبعاثاتهم وفقا لبدلاتهم خيارا بين اتخاذ تدابير للحد من انبعاثاتهم الخاصة - مثل الاستثمار في تكنولوجيا أكثر كفاءة أو استخدام مصادر طاقة أقل كثافة من الكربون - أو شراء البدلات الإضافية التي يحتاجونها في السوق ، أو مزيج من الاثنين. ومن المرجح أن تحدد هذه الخيارات بتكاليف نسبية. وبهذه الطريقة، تخفض الانبعاثات حيثما يكون ذلك أكثر فعالية من حيث التكلفة.
كم من الوقت كان الاتحاد الأوروبي إتس تعمل؟
تم إطلاق إتس الاتحاد الأوروبي في 1 يناير 2005. استمرت فترة التداول الأولى لمدة ثلاث سنوات حتى نهاية عام 2007 وكانت مرحلة "التعلم بالممارسة" للتحضير لفترة التداول الثانية الحاسمة. وبدأت فترة التداول الثانية في 1 يناير 2008 وتستمر لمدة خمس سنوات حتى نهاية عام 2018. وتأتي أهمية فترة التداول الثانية من كونها تتزامن مع فترة الالتزام الأولى لبروتوكول كيوتو، يجب على البلدان الصناعية أن تحقق أهدافها للحد من انبعاثات غازات الدفيئة أو الحد منها. وبالنسبة لفترة التداول الثانية، تم تحديد انبعاثات الاتحاد الأوروبي لانبعاثات غازات الدفيئة بنحو 6.5٪ عن مستويات عام 2005 للمساعدة على ضمان أن الاتحاد الأوروبي ككل، والدول الأعضاء على حدة، يفي بالتزامات كيوتو.
ما هي الدروس الرئيسية المستفادة من التجربة حتى الآن؟
وقد وضعت إتس الاتحاد الأوروبي سعرا على الكربون وأثبتت أن الاتجار في انبعاثات غازات الدفيئة يعمل. وقد أنشأت فترة التداول الأولى بنجاح التداول الحر لبدلات الانبعاث في جميع أنحاء الاتحاد الأوروبي، ووضعت البنية التحتية اللازمة، ووضعت سوقا ديناميكية للكربون. وقد تكون الفائدة البيئية للمرحلة الأولى محدودة بسبب التوزيع المفرط للبدلات في بعض الدول الأعضاء وبعض القطاعات، ويرجع ذلك أساسا إلى الاعتماد على إسقاطات الانبعاثات قبل أن تصبح بيانات الانبعاثات التي تم التحقق منها متاحة في إطار إتس للاتحاد الأوروبي. وعندما أبرز نشر بيانات الانبعاثات المؤكدة لعام 2005 هذا "الإفراط في تخصيص"، كان رد فعل السوق كما هو متوقع من خلال خفض سعر السوق للبدلات. وقد أتاح توافر بيانات الانبعاثات المؤكدة للجنة أن تكفل تحديد الحد الأقصى للمخصصات الوطنية في إطار المرحلة الثانية على مستوى يؤدي إلى تخفيضات حقيقية في الانبعاثات.
Besides underlining the need for verified data, experience so far has shown that greater harmonisation within the EU ETS is imperative to ensure that the EU achieves its emissions reductions objectives at least cost and with minimal competitive distortions. The need for more harmonisation is clearest with respect to how the cap on overall emission allowances is set.
The first two trading periods also show that widely differing national methods for allocating allowances to installations threaten fair competition in the internal market. Furthermore, greater harmonisation, clarification and refinement are needed with respect to the scope of the system, the access to credits from emission-reduction projects outside the EU, the conditions for linking the EU ETS to emissions trading systems elsewhere and the monitoring, verification and reporting requirements.
What are the main changes to the EU ETS and as of when will they apply?
The agreed design changes will apply as of the third trading period, i. e. January 2018. While preparatory work will be initiated immediately, the applicable rules will not change until January 2018 to ensure that regulatory stability is maintained.
The EU ETS in the third period will be a more efficient, more harmonised and fairer system.
Increased efficiency is achieved by means of a longer trading period (8 years instead of 5 years), a robust and annually declining emissions cap (21% reduction in 2020 compared to 2005) and a substantial increase in the amount of auctioning (from less than 4% in phase 2 to more than half in phase 3).
More harmonisation has been agreed in many areas, including with respect to the cap-setting (an EU-wide cap instead of the national caps in phases 1 and 2) and the rules for transitional free allocation.
The fairness of the system has been substantially increased by the move towards EU-wide free allocation rules for industrial installations and by the introduction of a redistribution mechanism that entitles new Member States to auction more allowances.
How does the final text compare to the initial Commission proposal?
The climate and energy targets agreed by the 2007 Spring European Council have been maintained and the overall architecture of the Commission's proposal on the EU ETS remains intact. That is to say that there will be one EU-wide cap on the number of emission allowances and this cap will decrease annually along a linear trend line, which will continue beyond the end of the third trading period (2018-2020). The main difference as compared to the proposal is that auctioning of allowances will be phased in more slowly.
What are the main changes compared to the Commission's proposal?
In summary, the main changes that have been made to the proposal are as follows:
Certain Member States are allowed an optional and temporary derogation from the rule that no allowances are to be allocated free of charge to electricity generators as of 2018. This option to derogate is available to Member States which fulfil certain conditions related to the interconnectivity of their electricity grid, share of a single fossil fuel in electricity production, and GDP/capita in relation to the EU-27 average. In addition, the amount of free allowances that a Member State can allocate to power plants is limited to 70% of carbon dioxide emissions of relevant plants in phase 1 and declines in the years thereafter. Furthermore free allocation in phase 3 can only be given to power plants that are operational or under construction no later than end 2008. See reply to question 15 below. There will be more details in the Directive on the criteria to be used to determine the sectors or sub-sectors deemed to be exposed to a significant risk of carbon leakage , and an earlier date of publication of the Commission's list of such sectors (31 December 2009). Moreover, subject to review when a satisfactory international agreement is reached, installations in all exposed industries will receive 100% free allowances to the extent that they use the most efficient technology. The free allocation to industry is limited to the share of these industries' emissions in total emissions in 2005 to 2007. The total number of allowances allocated for free to installations in industry sectors will decline annually in line with the decline of the emissions cap. Member States may also compensate certain installations for CO 2 costs passed on in electricity prices if the CO 2 costs might otherwise expose them to the risk of carbon leakage. The Commission has undertaken to modify the Community guidelines on state aid for environmental protection in this respect. See reply to question 15 below. The level of auctioning of allowances for non-exposed industry will increase in a linear manner as proposed by the Commission, but rather than reaching 100% by 2020 it will reach 70%, with a view to reaching 100% by 2027. As foreseen in the Commission's proposal, 10% of the allowances for auctioning will be redistributed from Member States with high per capita income to those with low per capita income in order to strengthen the financial capacity of the latter to invest in climate friendly technologies. A provision has been added for another redistributive mechanism of 2% of auctioned allowances to take into account Member States which in 2005 had achieved a reduction of at least 20% in greenhouse gas emissions compared with the reference year set by the Kyoto Protocol. The share of auctioning revenues that Member States are recommended to use to fight and adapt to climate change mainly within the EU, but also in developing countries, is raised from 20% to 50%. The text provides for a top-up to the proposed permitted level of use of JI/CDM credits in the 20% scenario for existing operators that received the lowest budgets to import and use such credits in relation to allocations and access to credits in the period 2008-2018. New sectors, new entrants in the periods 2018-2020 and 2008-2018 will also be able to use credits. The total amount of credits that may be used will, however, not exceed 50% of the reduction between 2008 and 2020. Based on a stricter emissions reduction in the context of a satisfactory international agreement, the Commission could allow additional access to CERs and ERUs for operators in the Community scheme. See reply to question 20 below. The proceeds from auctioning 300 million allowances from the new entrants reserve will be used to support up to 12 carbon capture and storage demonstration projects and projects demonstrating innovative renewable energy technologies. A number of conditions are attached to this financing mechanism. See reply to question 30 below. The possibility to opt-out small combustion installations provided they are subject to equivalent measures has been extended to cover all small installations irrespective of activity, the emission threshold has been raised from 10,000 to 25,000 tonnes of CO 2 per year, and the capacity threshold that combustion installations have to fulfil in addition has been raised from 25MW to 35MW. With these increased thresholds, the share of covered emissions that would potentially be excluded from the emissions trading system becomes significant, and consequently a provision has been added to allow for a corresponding reduction of the EU-wide cap on allowances.
Will there still be national allocation plans (NAPs)?
No. In their NAPs for the first (2005-2007) and the second (2008-2018) trading periods, Member States determined the total quantity of allowances to be issued – the cap – and how these would be allocated to the installations concerned. This approach has generated significant differences in allocation rules, creating an incentive for each Member State to favour its own industry, and has led to great complexity.
As from the third trading period, there will be a single EU-wide cap and allowances will be allocated on the basis of harmonised rules. National allocation plans will therefore not be needed any more.
How will the emission cap in phase 3 be determined?
The rules for calculating the EU-wide cap are as follows:
From 2018, the total number of allowances will decrease annually in a linear manner. The starting point of this line is the average total quantity of allowances (phase 2 cap) to be issued by Member States for the 2008-12 period, adjusted to reflect the broadened scope of the system from 2018 as well as any small installations that Member States have chosen to exclude. The linear factor by which the annual amount shall decrease is 1.74% in relation to the phase 2 cap.
The starting point for determining the linear factor of 1.74% is the 20% overall reduction of greenhouse gases compared to 1990, which is equivalent to a 14% reduction compared to 2005. However, a larger reduction is required of the EU ETS because it is cheaper to reduce emissions in the ETS sectors. The division that minimises overall reduction cost amounts to:
a 21% reduction in EU ETS sector emissions compared to 2005 by 2020; a reduction of around 10% compared to 2005 for the sectors that are not covered by the EU ETS.
The 21% reduction in 2020 results in an ETS cap in 2020 of a maximum of 1720 million allowances and implies an average phase 3 cap (2018 to 2020) of some 1846 million allowances and a reduction of 11% compared to the phase 2 cap.
All absolute figures indicated correspond to the coverage at the start of the second trading period and therefore don't take account of aviation, which will be added in 2018, and other sectors that will be added in phase 3.
The final figures for the annual emission caps in phase 3 will be determined and published by the Commission by 30 September 2018.
How will the emission cap beyond phase 3 be determined?
The linear factor of 1.74% used to determine the phase 3 cap will continue to apply beyond the end of the trading period in 2020 and will determine the cap for the fourth trading period (2021 to 2028) and beyond. It may be revised by 2025 at the latest. In fact, significant emission reductions of 60%-80% compared to 1990 will be necessary by 2050 to reach the strategic objective of limiting the global average temperature increase to not more than 2°C above pre-industrial levels.
An EU-wide cap on emission allowances will be determined for each individual year. Will this reduce flexibility for the installations concerned?
No, flexibility for installations will not be reduced at all. In any year, the allowances to be auctioned and distributed have to be issued by the competent authorities by 28 February. The last date for operators to surrender allowances is 30 April of the year following the year in which the emissions took place. So operators receive allowances for the current year before they have to surrender allowances to cover their emissions for the previous year. Allowances remain valid throughout the trading period and any surplus allowances can now be "banked" for use in subsequent trading periods. In this respect nothing will change.
The system will remain based on trading periods, but the third trading period will last eight years, from 2018 to 2020, as opposed to five years for the second phase from 2008 to 2018.
For the second trading period Member States generally decided to allocate equal total quantities of allowances for each year. The linear decrease each year from 2018 will correspond better to expected emissions trends over the period.
What are the tentative annual ETS cap figures for the period 2018 to 2020?
The tentative annual cap figures are as follows:
These figures are based on the scope of the ETS as applicable in phase 2 (2008 to 2018), and the Commission's decisions on the national allocation plans for phase 2, amounting to 2083 million tonnes. These figures will be adjusted for several reasons. Firstly, adjustment will be made to take into account the extensions of the scope in phase 2, provided that Member States substantiate and verify their emissions accruing from these extensions. Secondly, adjustment will be made with respect to further extensions of the scope of the ETS in the third trading period. Thirdly, any opt-out of small installations will lead to a corresponding reduction of the cap. Fourthly, the figures do not take account of the inclusion of aviation, nor of emissions from Norway, Iceland and Liechtenstein.
Will allowances still be allocated for free?
نعم فعلا. Industrial installations will receive transitional free allocation. And in those Member States that are eligible for the optional derogation, power plants may, if the Member State so decides, also receive free allowances. It is estimated that at least half of the available allowances as of 2018 will be auctioned.
While the great majority of allowances has been allocated free of charge to installations in the first and second trading periods, the Commission proposed that auctioning of allowances should become the basic principle for allocation. This is because auctioning best ensures the efficiency, transparency and simplicity of the system and creates the greatest incentive for investments in a low-carbon economy. It best complies with the “polluter pays principle” and avoids giving windfall profits to certain sectors that have passed on the notional cost of allowances to their customers despite receiving them for free.
How will allowances be handed out for free?
By 31 December 2018, the Commission will adopt EU-wide rules, which will be developed under a committee procedure (“Comitology”). These rules will fully harmonise allocations and thus all firms across the EU with the same or similar activities will be subject to the same rules. The rules will ensure as far as possible that the allocation promotes carbon-efficient technologies. The adopted rules provide that to the extent feasible, allocations are to be based on so-called benchmarks, e. g. a number of allowances per quantity of historical output. Such rules reward operators that have taken early action to reduce greenhouse gases, better reflect the polluter pays principle and give stronger incentives to reduce emissions, as allocations would no longer depend on historical emissions. All allocations are to be determined before the start of the third trading period and no ex-post adjustments will be allowed.
Which installations will receive free allocations and which will not? How will negative impacts on competitiveness be avoided?
Taking into account their ability to pass on the increased cost of emission allowances, full auctioning is the rule from 2018 onwards for electricity generators. However, Member States who fulfil certain conditions relating to their interconnectivity or their share of fossil fuels in electricity production and GDP per capita in relation to the EU-27 average, have the option to temporarily deviate from this rule with respect to existing power plants. The auctioning rate in 2018 is to be at least 30% in relation to emissions in the first period and has to increase progressively to 100% no later than 2020. If the option is applied, the Member State has to undertake to invest in improving and upgrading of the infrastructure, in clean technologies and in diversification of their energy mix and sources of supply for an amount to the extent possible equal to the market value of the free allocation.
In other sectors, allocations for free will be phased out progressively from 2018, with Member States agreeing to start at 20% auctioning in 2018, increasing to 70% auctioning in 2020 with a view to reaching 100% in 2027. However, an exception will be made for installations in sectors that are found to be exposed to a significant risk of 'carbon leakage'. This risk could occur if the EU ETS increased production costs so much that companies decided to relocate production to areas outside the EU that are not subject to comparable emission constraints. The Commission will determine the sectors concerned by 31 December 2009. To do this, the Commission will assess inter alia whether the direct and indirect additional production costs induced by the implementation of the ETS Directive as a proportion of gross value added exceed 5% and whether the total value of its exports and imports divided by the total value of its turnover and imports exceeds 10%. If the result for either of these criteria exceeds 30%, the sector would also be considered to be exposed to a significant risk of carbon leakage. Installations in these sectors would receive 100% of their share in the annually declining total quantity of allowances for free. The share of these industries' emissions is determined in relation to total ETS emissions in 2005 to 2007.
CO 2 costs passed on in electricity prices could also expose certain installations to the risk of carbon leakage. In order to avoid such risk, Member States may grant a compensation with respect to such costs. In the absence of an international agreement on climate change, the Commission has undertaken to modify the Community guidelines on state aid for environmental protection in this respect.
Under an international agreement which ensures that competitors in other parts of the world bear a comparable cost, the risk of carbon leakage may well be negligible. Therefore, by 30 June 2018, the Commission will carry out an in-depth assessment of the situation of energy-intensive industry and the risk of carbon leakage, in the light of the outcome of the international negotiations and also taking into account any binding sectoral agreements that may have been concluded. The report will be accompanied by any proposals considered appropriate. These could potentially include maintaining or adjusting the proportion of allowances received free of charge to industrial installations that are particularly exposed to global competition or including importers of the products concerned in the ETS.
Who will organise the auctions and how will they be carried out?
Member States will be responsible for ensuring that the allowances given to them are auctioned. Each Member State has to decide whether it wants to develop its own auctioning infrastructure and platform or whether it wants to cooperate with other Member States to develop regional or EU-wide solutions. The distribution of the auctioning rights to Member States is largely based on emissions in phase 1 of the EU ETS, but a part of the rights will be redistributed from richer Member States to poorer ones to take account of the lower GDP per head and higher prospects for growth and emissions among the latter. It is still the case that 10% of the rights to auction allowances will be redistributed from Member States with high per capita income to those with low per capita income in order to strengthen the financial capacity of the latter to invest in climate friendly technologies. However, a provision has been added for another redistributive mechanism of 2% to take into account Member States which in 2005 had achieved a reduction of at least 20% in greenhouse gas emissions compared with the reference year set by the Kyoto Protocol. Nine Member States benefit from this provision.
Any auctioning must respect the rules of the internal market and must therefore be open to any potential buyer under non-discriminatory conditions. By 30 June 2018, the Commission will adopt a Regulation (through the comitology procedure) that will provide the appropriate rules and conditions for ensuring efficient, coordinated auctions without disturbing the allowance market.
How many allowances will each Member State auction and how is this amount determined?
All allowances which are not allocated free of charge will be auctioned. A total of 88% of allowances to be auctioned by each Member State is distributed on the basis of the Member State's share of historic emissions under the EU ETS. For purposes of solidarity and growth, 12% of the total quantity is distributed in a way that takes into account GDP per capita and the achievements under the Kyoto-Protocol.
Which sectors and gases are covered as of 2018?
The ETS covers installations performing specified activities. Since the start it has covered, above certain capacity thresholds, power stations and other combustion plants, oil refineries, coke ovens, iron and steel plants and factories making cement, glass, lime, bricks, ceramics, pulp, paper and board. As for greenhouse gases, it currently only covers carbon dioxide emissions, with the exception of the Netherlands, which has opted in emissions from nitrous oxide.
As from 2018, the scope of the ETS will be extended to also include other sectors and greenhouse gases. CO 2 emissions from petrochemicals, ammonia and aluminium will be included, as will N2O emissions from the production of nitric, adipic and glyocalic acid production and perfluorocarbons from the aluminium sector. The capture, transport and geological storage of all greenhouse gas emissions will also be covered. These sectors will receive allowances free of charge according to EU-wide rules, in the same way as other industrial sectors already covered.
As of 2018, aviation will also be included in the EU ETS.
Will small installations be excluded from the scope?
A large number of installations emitting relatively low amounts of CO 2 are currently covered by the ETS and concerns have been raised over the cost-effectiveness of their inclusion. As from 2018, Member States will be allowed to remove these installations from the ETS under certain conditions. The installations concerned are those whose reported emissions were lower than 25 000 tonnes of CO 2 equivalent in each of the 3 years preceding the year of application. For combustion installations, an additional capacity threshold of 35MW applies. In addition Member States are given the possibility to exclude installations operated by hospitals. The installations may be excluded from the ETS only if they will be covered by measures that will achieve an equivalent contribution to emission reductions.
How many emission credits from third countries will be allowed?
For the second trading period, Member States allowed their operators to use significant quantities of credits generated by emission-saving projects undertaken in third countries to cover part of their emissions in the same way as they use ETS allowances. The revised Directive extends the rights to use these credits for the third trading period and allows a limited additional quantity to be used in such a way that the overall use of credits is limited to 50% of the EU-wide reductions over the period 2008-2020. For existing installations, and excluding new sectors within the scope, this will represent a total level of access of approximately 1.6 billion credits over the period 2008-2020. In practice, this means that existing operators will be able to use credits up to a minimum of 11% of their allocation during the period 2008-2018, while a top-up is foreseen for operators with the lowest sum of free allocation and allowed use of credits in the 2008-2018 period. New sectors and new entrants in the third trading period will have a guaranteed minimum access of 4.5% of their verified emissions during the period 2018-2020. For the aviation sector, the minimum access will be 1.5%. The precise percentages will be determined through comitology.
These projects must be officially recognised under the Kyoto Protocol’s Joint Implementation (JI) mechanism (covering projects carried out in countries with an emissions reduction target under the Protocol) or Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) (for projects undertaken in developing countries). Credits from JI projects are known as Emission Reduction Units (ERUs) while those from CDM projects are called Certified Emission Reductions (CERs).
On the quality side only credits from project types eligible for use in the EU trading scheme during the period 2008-2018 will be accepted in the period 2018-2020. Furthermore, from 1 January 2018 measures may be applied to restrict the use of specific credits from project types. Such a quality control mechanism is needed to assure the environmental and economic integrity of future project types.
To create greater flexibility, and in the absence of an international agreement being concluded by 31 December 2009, credits could be used in accordance with agreements concluded with third countries. The use of these credits should however not increase the overall number beyond 50% of the required reductions. Such agreements would not be required for new projects that started from 2018 onwards in Least Developed Countries.
Based on a stricter emissions reduction in the context of a satisfactory international agreement , additional access to credits could be allowed, as well as the use of additional types of project credits or other mechanisms created under the international agreement. However, once an international agreement has been reached, from January 2018 onwards only credits from projects in third countries that have ratified the agreement or from additional types of project approved by the Commission will be eligible for use in the Community scheme.
Will it be possible to use credits from carbon ‘sinks’ like forests?
No. Before making its proposal, the Commission analysed the possibility of allowing credits from certain types of land use, land-use change and forestry (‘LULUCF’) projects which absorb carbon from the atmosphere. It concluded that doing so could undermine the environmental integrity of the EU ETS, for the following reasons:
LULUCF projects cannot physically deliver permanent emissions reductions. Insufficient solutions have been developed to deal with the uncertainties, non-permanence of carbon storage and potential emissions 'leakage' problems arising from such projects. The temporary and reversible nature of such activities would pose considerable risks in a company-based trading system and impose great liability risks on Member States. The inclusion of LULUCF projects in the ETS would require a quality of monitoring and reporting comparable to the monitoring and reporting of emissions from installations currently covered by the system. This is not available at present and is likely to incur costs which would substantially reduce the attractiveness of including such projects. The simplicity, transparency and predictability of the ETS would be considerably reduced. Moreover, the sheer quantity of potential credits entering the system could undermine the functioning of the carbon market unless their role were limited, in which case their potential benefits would become marginal.
The Commission, the Council and the European Parliament believe that global deforestation can be better addressed through other instruments. For example, using part of the proceeds from auctioning allowances in the EU ETS could generate additional means to invest in LULUCF activities both inside and outside the EU, and may provide a model for future expansion. In this respect the Commission has proposed to set up the Global Forest Carbon Mechanism that would be a performance-based system for financing reductions in deforestation levels in developing countries.
Besides those already mentioned, are there other credits that could be used in the revised ETS?
نعم فعلا. Projects in EU Member States which reduce greenhouse gas emissions not covered by the ETS could issue credits. These Community projects would need to be managed according to common EU provisions set up by the Commission in order to be tradable throughout the system. Such provisions would be adopted only for projects that cannot be realised through inclusion in the ETS. The provisions will seek to ensure that credits from Community projects do not result in double-counting of emission reductions nor impede other policy measures to reduce emissions not covered by the ETS, and that they are based on simple, easily administered rules.
Are there measures in place to ensure that the price of allowances won't fall sharply during the third trading period?
A stable and predictable regulatory framework is vital for market stability. The revised Directive makes the regulatory framework as predictable as possible in order to boost stability and rule out policy-induced volatility. Important elements in this respect are the determination of the cap on emissions in the Directive well in advance of the start of the trading period, a linear reduction factor for the cap on emissions which continues to apply also beyond 2020 and the extension of the trading period from 5 to 8 years. The sharp fall in the allowance price during the first trading period was due to over-allocation of allowances which could not be “banked” for use in the second trading period. For the second and subsequent trading periods, Member States are obliged to allow the banking of allowances from one period to the next and therefore the end of one trading period is not expected to have any impact on the price.
A new provision will apply as of 2018 in case of excessive price fluctuations in the allowance market. If, for more than six consecutive months, the allowance price is more than three times the average price of allowances during the two preceding years on the European market, the Commission will convene a meeting with Member States. If it is found that the price evolution does not correspond to market fundamentals, the Commission may either allow Member States to bring forward the auctioning of a part of the quantity to be auctioned, or allow them to auction up to 25% of the remaining allowances in the new entrant reserve.
The price of allowances is determined by supply and demand and reflects fundamental factors like economic growth, fuel prices, rainfall and wind (availability of renewable energy) and temperature (demand for heating and cooling) etc. A degree of uncertainty is inevitable for such factors. The markets, however, allow participants to hedge the risks that may result from changes in allowances prices.
Are there any provisions for linking the EU ETS to other emissions trading systems?
نعم فعلا. One of the key means to reduce emissions more cost-effectively is to enhance and further develop the global carbon market. The Commission sees the EU ETS as an important building block for the development of a global network of emission trading systems. Linking other national or regional cap-and-trade emissions trading systems to the EU ETS can create a bigger market, potentially lowering the aggregate cost of reducing greenhouse gas emissions. The increased liquidity and reduced price volatility that this would entail would improve the functioning of markets for emission allowances. This may lead to a global network of trading systems in which participants, including legal entities, can buy emission allowances to fulfil their respective reduction commitments.
The EU is keen to work with the new US Administration to build a transatlantic and indeed global carbon market to act as the motor of a concerted international push to combat climate change.
While the original Directive allows for linking the EU ETS with other industrialised countries that have ratified the Kyoto Protocol, the new rules allow for linking with any country or administrative entity (such as a state or group of states under a federal system) which has established a compatible mandatory cap-and-trade system whose design elements would not undermine the environmental integrity of the EU ETS. Where such systems cap absolute emissions, there would be mutual recognition of allowances issued by them and the EU ETS.
What is a Community registry and how does it work?
Registries are standardised electronic databases ensuring the accurate accounting of the issuance, holding, transfer and cancellation of emission allowances. As a signatory to the Kyoto Protocol in its own right, the Community is also obliged to maintain a registry. This is the Community Registry, which is distinct from the registries of Member States. Allowances issued from 1 January 2018 onwards will be held in the Community registry instead of in national registries.
Will there be any changes to monitoring, reporting and verification requirements?
The Commission will adopt a new Regulation (through the comitology procedure) by 31 December 2018 governing the monitoring and reporting of emissions from the activities listed in Annex I of the Directive. A separate Regulation on the verification of emission reports and the accreditation of verifiers should specify conditions for accreditation, mutual recognition and cancellation of accreditation for verifiers, and for supervision and peer review as appropriate.
What provision will be made for new entrants into the market?
Five percent of the total quantity of allowances will be put into a reserve for new installations or airlines that enter the system after 2018 (“new entrants”). The allocations from this reserve should mirror the allocations to corresponding existing installations.
A part of the new entrant reserve, amounting to 300 million allowances, will be made available to support the investments in up to 12 demonstration projects using the carbon capture and storage technology and demonstration projects using innovative renewable energy technologies. There should be a fair geographical distribution of the projects.
In principle, any allowances remaining in the reserve shall be distributed to Member States for auctioning. The distribution key shall take into account the level to which installations in Member States have benefited from this reserve.
What has been agreed with respect to the financing of the 12 carbon capture and storage demonstration projects requested by a previous European Council?
The European Parliament's Environment Committee tabled an amendment to the EU ETS Directive requiring allowances in the new entrant reserve to be set aside in order to co-finance up to 12 demonstration projects as requested by the European Council in spring 2007. This amendment has later been extended to include also innovative renewable energy technologies that are not commercially viable yet. Projects shall be selected on the basis of objective and transparent criteria that include requirements for knowledge sharing. Support shall be given from the proceeds of these allowances via Member States and shall be complementary to substantial co-financing by the operator of the installation. No project shall receive support via this mechanism that exceeds 15% of the total number of allowances (i. e. 45 million allowances) available for this purpose. The Member State may choose to co-finance the project as well, but will in any case transfer the market value of the attributed allowances to the operator, who will not receive any allowances.
A total of 300 million allowances will therefore be set aside until 2018 for this purpose.
What is the role of an international agreement and its potential impact on EU ETS?
When an international agreement is reached, the Commission shall submit a report to the European Parliament and the Council assessing the nature of the measures agreed upon in the international agreement and their implications, in particular with respect to the risk of carbon leakage. On the basis of this report, the Commission shall then adopt a legislative proposal amending the present Directive as appropriate.
For the effects on the use of credits from Joint Implementation and Clean Development Mechanism projects, please see the reply to question 20.
What are the next steps?
Member States have to bring into force the legal instruments necessary to comply with certain provisions of the revised Directive by 31 December 2009. This concerns the collection of duly substantiated and verified emissions data from installations that will only be covered by the EU ETS as from 2018, and the national lists of installations and the allocation to each one. For the remaining provisions, the national laws, regulations and administrative provisions only have to be ready by 31 December 2018.
The Commission has already started the work on implementation. For example, the collection and analysis of data for use in relation to carbon leakage is ongoing (list of sectors due end 2009). Work is also ongoing to prepare the Regulation on timing, administration and other aspects of auctioning (due by June 2018), the harmonised allocation rules (due end 2018) and the two Regulations on monitoring and reporting of emissions and verification of emissions and accreditation of verifiers (due end 2018).

Principles of the trading system-extended demonstration

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NUMSA.
Non-racialism – to be strong we need to organise all workers. The employers used apartheid to divide workers. Numsa tries to break down the division between white and black workers and build unity. Democracy and worker control – in every structure we have a majority of workers to make sure that workers make the decisions and not officials; members elect their representatives, called shop stewards. Unity of metalworkers and all workers in South Africa and internationally – we need one union in the metal industry in South Africa so we can act as one against employers locally and internationally and to put united pressure on government.
Numsa’s long term vision is of a united South Africa where the minority will no longer exploit and oppress the majority. For many, this is the socialism that we are still striving for. An organised and united working class must make sure we achieve this goal.
Numsa’s principles and policies stem from an analysis of where workers get their power from.
Workers are not like bosses. They cannot buy power with money. Workers get power from:
Numbers – workers are many, but bosses are few. Unity – workers are strong when they act together but weak when they are divided. Organisation – trade unions organise workers to act together and be united. Industrial action – workers do the work, if workers refuse to work there is no production and no money for the bosses. Protest action – having pickets and demonstrations tells the government and/or bosses what we feel and puts pressure on them to listen to our demands. Solidarity – we can use the power of the community or the whole industry to help our struggle.
Numsa has many different policies to guide its actions. This is just a summary of some of its main ones. If you want more details contact your Local Numsa office, or see NUMSA Policy on this website Workplace policies.
Close the apartheid wage gap. Apartheid built up big wage differences between skilled and unskilled workers. This gap was mostly a gap between white and black workers. Push employers to provide training that will be recognised in other companies if those workers lose their jobs. Reduce the number of grades at workplaces to 5 and make it a skills based grading system. This way anyone that does some training could be rewarded with higher pay because they will be more skilled. For employers to recognise the skills that workers have learnt on the job and pay them for those skills. Make sure that women are given jobs that are traditionally held by men if they are skilled enough to do them. Women must be paid equally for doing the same job as men. Have more control over management’s investment plans and strategies. If the company is planning massive retrenchments, Numsa wants to know so that it can help to reduce the effect on members.
Numsa also believes in meaningful affirmative action. It does not want ex-Numsa shop stewards promoted to human resources positions and then they become tokens because they are given no power to transform the workplace.
Numsa wants affirmative action for all workers. Training will skill workers and automatically move them into more skilled positions with higher pay.
Workers need technical training and basic education. Employers must allow them time to do this during working hours.
There must be no more discrimination against workers whether it is because of their race, their gender or their religion. All workers must be treated the same.
The work places where Numsa members work are dangerous. Numsa tries hard to protect workers from dangerous and unhealthy conditions.
Numsa will help educate members around the big problem of AIDS. It will also defend AIDS sufferers from losing any benefits like their pension or provident funds and from being discriminated against at their workplace because of their illness.
20 years after the end of apartheid, South Africa still displays its racial past. It has the unenviable position of being the country with the highest inequality as measured by the Gini coefficient. The country’s unemployment rate is at 25% (or 36%) depending on which measure is used and refuses to drop. The vast majority of the unemployed are young and black. Poverty has dropped marginally but 15 million out of 50 million are still living in poverty.
Numsa believes that real change must happen in the economy if this extreme inequality, unemployment and poverty are to be corrected.
Policies such as the government’s National Development Plan which the ANC adopted in 2018, Numsa believes will do nothing to challenge the underlying problem of the domination of the economy by a few companies, the majority of them multinationals or white-owned with a smattering of black faces.
Since this exhibition was produced in 2018, the ANC government has done a number of things that have forced Numsa to question whether this Alliance really will improve workers’ lives.
Numsa was aware that the ANC victory in 1994 was only a partial victory. The ANC won political power but it did not win economic power. It had hoped that the ANC government, guided by its document the Freedom Charter, would move towards a society that was closer to Numsa’s vision.
However when the ANC adopted the National Development Plan (NDP) in 2018, refused to ban labour brokers and sped up the privatisation of roads through tolls, Numsa saw them as further examples of the ANC’s reluctance to shift the economy in a more left-wing direction.
From 2018, Numsa found a more disturbing pattern emerging with its own federation, Cosatu, moving towards the ANC and away from a more radical stance. Radical resolutions that were adopted at the Cosatu congress in 2018 remain as paper resolutions. The suspension of the Cosatu general secretary, Zwelinzima Vavi, in August 2018 added to Numsa’s concern that there was deliberate inaction in the federation so as to keep it as a toothless lapdog of the ANC in the run up to national government elections in 2018.
Since the first democratic elections in 1994 Numsa had always put extensive resources, both financial and human, into campaigning for the ANC. With the worrisome right-wing trends in the ANC and Cosatu, Numsa decided to hold a special meeting of its highest decision making body, the national congress, in December 2018. The national congress followed extensive consultations with Numsa members at factory, local and regional level on key issues like:
What should NUMSA’s approach be to the coming elections in 2018?
What should Numsa do about the alliance? What are the alternatives to the Alliance? How can Numsa reclaim Cosatu and transform it into an independent, militant, revolutionary, socialist-oriented, anti-imperialist, worker-controlled and democratic organisation?
At this special national congress, Numsa resolved:
To call on Cosatu to break the alliance To build a united front of organisations that are against neo-liberalism and to take up joint campaigns around common demands To call for the resignation of President Jacob Zuma because of his government’s neo-liberal stance and the misappropriate use of state funds To continue to push for the convening of a special Cosatu national congress while engaging with like-minded affiliates and other trade unions outside of Cosatu Not to support any political party in the 2018 government elections. However Numsa members have the right to vote for the political party of their choice Not to support the ANC or any political party financially or with manpower. However individual Numsa officials, shop stewards or members can campaign in their own time and with their own resources for the political party of their choice To stop paying the political fund levy to Cosatu On a Numsa service charter that sets out Numsa staff and leaders’ commitments to members To move from organising along industries/sectors to organising along value chains.

Applying Economic Principles to Health Care.
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Applying economic thinking to an understanding of resource use in patient care is challenging given the complexities of delivering health care in a hospital. Health-care markets lack the characteristics needed to determine a "market" price that reflects the economic value of resources used. However, resource allocation in a hospital can be analyzed by using production theory to determine efficient resource use. The information provided by hospital epidemiologists is critical to understanding health-care production processes used by a hospital and developing economic incentives to promote antibiotic effectiveness and infection control.
The application of basic textbook principles to understanding economic behavior in the health-care industry is not a straightforward exercise because of the complex nature of health care as a service or product. Health care is not an item that is pulled off a store shelf, placed in a shopping cart, and paid for at the cash register. The desired result cannot be guaranteed and depends on various factors, many of which are beyond the control of the health-care provider. Economic analysis is based on the fundamental notion of efficient use of available resources. Two basic points are 1) economics is about resource allocation, and 2) efficiency in resource use (getting the most from available resources) in health care can be understood by identifying production functions representing health-care services.
Economics is a behavioral science that begins with two propositions about human behavior. First, human behavior is purposeful or goal directed, implying that persons act to promote their own interests. Second, human desires and demands are unlimited; however, resources are limited and cannot meet unlimited demands. Thus, the basic problem addressed by economics is how to allocate limited resources among unlimited demands. Within this context, the concept of cost in economics is based on opportunity costs rather than financial costs. Opportunity cost is the value of a resource when it is employed in its next best use. Costs are not expressed as expenses paid (or financial accounting) but as the value of lost output if resources were employed in an alternative productive process.
With the focus on resource allocation, one of the main concerns in designing a social mechanism to allocate society's resources is efficiency--getting the greatest output from productive inputs (a problem for suppliers). Another concern is product choice--determining what goods and services should be produced (meeting consumer demands). Finally, there is concern about product distribution (who gets the products produced).
The Gold Standard of Resource Allocation Mechanisms.
Understanding the social conditions that affect resource allocation is at the heart of economic thinking. Economics has what can be referred to as a 'gold standard' of resource allocation mechanisms--the perfectly competitive market, which has the following characteristics ( 1 ): 1) many buyers and sellers with no single economic agent influencing the exchange of goods among market participants; 2) a homogeneous or standardized product (i. e., goods that individual producers cannot alter or differentiate to collect a higher price); 3) no barriers to movement of firms into or out of the market; 4) perfect information about market conditions that is available to all market participants; and 5) a fully defined system of property rights in which ownership of all products and productive resources is assigned.
Figure 1. Supply and demand curves.
This mechanism allows producers and consumers to freely interact; and from this interaction, consumer preferences about the product are revealed (Figure 1, demand curve), as well as the quantity producers are willing to supply at various prices (Figure 1, supply curve). The demand curve shows that consumers will purchase greater quantities of a good as price decreases, while the supply curve shows that producers will produce greater quantities of a good as product price increases. As market participants interact, an equilibrium price level will emerge so that the quantity demanded at price P E by consumers is equal to the quantity that producers will supply at price P E . P E becomes the market price because at no other price level does the quantity demanded by consumers match the quantity provided by suppliers. Prices greater than this level will result in excess supply; prices below this level result in excess demand.
Prices in a perfectly competitive market act as a feedback mechanism to market participants. Prices simultaneously reflect the value of the product to consumers and provide a signal to suppliers whether to change the amount of product they should produce relative to changes in consumer demand.
The market for antibiotic drugs provides an example of how prices communicate preferences in the market place. There is debate regarding the extent to which prices for antibiotic drugs encourage the development and production of new agents to counter antibiotic resistance. An economist would assess this issue by examining the market price for antibiotics to determine whether prices are communicating to producers that new drugs are needed to meet future demands. If prices are not providing the appropriate "feedback," an economist would identify the characteristics in the market (e. g., number of producers, barriers to market entry or exit) responsible for the distortion in the price signal to market suppliers.
The power of the perfectly competitive market is that the perspectives of consumers, producers, and society as a whole converge. This market structure provides incentives for individual economic agents to act ultimately in the best interest of society (e. g., produce the greatest possible output from limited resources). Producers must be efficient and get the most output from the resources used. Inefficient producers will be unable to make a profit in the long run and will be forced to leave the market. Across the various markets, consumer demands are met (product choice), producers supply the most output possible (therefore maximizing profits), and society gets the most output from the scarce resources available.
Other types of resource allocation mechanisms are associated with markets with different characteristics, such as monopolies (single seller, e. g., power utilities) or oligopolies (a few sellers, e. g., automobile industry). However, these markets have shortcomings in terms of promoting the greatest output from society's resources and achieving the level of efficiency that could be obtained by the perfect market.
Resource Allocation in Health Care.
Examination of resource allocation in the health-care industry is complicated because the market characteristics differ from those in a perfectly competitive market. The market for health-care services is considered an imperfect market because--
1)Health care is a heterogeneous product, as the patient can experience a range of outcomes; 2) Patients who are insured have third-party payers covering their direct medical expenses; and 3) A "market price" is lacking, i. e., no feedback mechanism exists that reflects the value of the resources used in health care.
While the perspectives of consumers, producers, and society converge in a perfectly competitive market, hospital patient costs in the health-care market are different for patients (consumers), health-care providers (suppliers), insurance companies (third-party payers), and society. The economic impacts of pain and suffering are of concern to the patient and society, but may not be relevant to a purely economic analysis of costs from the perspective of health-care providers or third-party payers ( 2 ).
Regardless of perspective, economic thinking provides one common goal: efficiency, or getting the most from available resources. A hospital administrator, for example, is faced with the challenge of organizing resources to meet the organization's goals. The relationship between the range of productive inputs utilized and outputs produced can be characterized by a production function, which shows the maximum amount of product that can be obtained from any specific combination of resources (or inputs) used in producing a product (or output). By identifying the relationship between output and inputs, one can find the combination of inputs and output that maximizes economic return.
Figure 2. Standard curve of production function, demonstrating the relation between one input and one output.
The classic production function from economic theory follows a standard curve (Figure 2) that demonstrates the relation between one input and one output ( 3 ). This curve involves a variable input as opposed to a fixed input. Changes in the quantity of variable inputs will cause variation in the quantity of output produced (e. g., varying application of a fertilizer to a crop). Fixed inputs are those that must be in place before production can begin and do not vary with output levels (e. g., buildings). This curve embodies the notion of diminishing marginal returns. As one increases an input, a point is reached at which the additional output produced by adding another unit of input begins to get smaller and smaller, ultimately leading to a decline in the total output produced. The fixed input becomes overextended by the expanded production. For example, adding too much fertilizer to a crop can compromise soil quality and lead to a decline in output.
This is a technical relationship that does not yet include dollars. If the organizational goal is to maximize output, a producer would employ I B units of input to produce O B units of output. This approach would make sense if inputs were free. However, inputs are usually not free. This is where an economist steps in. At some point before the maximum, the value of the additional output created by an additional unit of input is less than the cost of this additional input (e. g., spending $10 in additional input costs may yield only $8 in additional output value). The decision rule is to produce only as long as the value of additional output is just equal to the cost of the additional input ( ( 1 ) ).
For this figure, the region where it is "economic" to produce is somewhere between input quantities I A and I B . The information needed to identify these productive relationships in a hospital must come from hospital epidemiologists as well as from hospital accountants. Epidemiology, being the principal measurement tool for population health status, provides measures of health-care outcomes (outputs). Measures of resource use (inputs) in a hospital should be based on hospital purchasing and cost accounting records (as opposed to hospital patient charges that do not accurately reflect actual resource use).
Resource Use for Preserving Antibiotic Effectiveness.
The framework for identifying efficient resource use can be applied to the production of health care in a hospital. Two major concerns of hospital epidemiologists are the effectiveness of antibiotic drugs and the incidence of health care-associated infections. Policy makers in health care are concerned about antibiotic resistance and how to maximize the effectiveness of existing antibiotic drugs. A production function quantifies the flow of resources that can be used to promote this effectiveness. Understanding the production function will help identify the trade-offs a clinician must make between the patient's health, the antibiotic treatment to prescribe, and the impact of this treatment on the rate of resistance. However, two production processes are affected by the decision to use antibiotics: promoting an individual patient's health and maintaining antibiotic effectiveness in the treatment of future patients.
The economic analysis in this instance is similar in complexity to the analysis of environmental problems such as air and water quality ( 4 ). Like clean air and clean water, antibiotic effectiveness is an economic good that is difficult to allocate efficiently using our gold standard allocation mechanism because it has some characteristics of a public good. Public goods represent a class of economic goods because by their nature they are nonrivaled and nonexclusive in consumption. The classic example of a public good often used by economists is national defense. It is unrivaled in consumption because, once provided, one person's consumption of defense does not affect another person's consumption. It is nonexclusive in consumption because, once provided, there is no practical way to exclude or prevent consumption of defense by those who choose not to pay for providing it. Because of these product chaaracteristics, public goods will not work in our ideal resource allocation mechanism because there is no practical way to reveal a demand curve for a public good. Public goods are usually provided by a governmental agency (thus the name public good) or by some type of collective organization.
Figure 3. Continuum illustrating the degree to which an economic good has characteristics that make it a private or public good.
A continuum (Figure 3) can be used to describe the degree to which a particular economic good possesses characteristics that make it a private or public good. Antibiotic effectiveness falls between these two classes: it is exclusive in that only medical professionals (at least in the developed world) can administer the drug, but it is not purely nonrivaled because consumption of antibiotics by one person can affect future consumption by others.
This leads to an externality: the use of a resource or product by one person can affect others without their permission. The decision to provide antibiotic treatment to one patient can affect the future efficacy and quality of the drug to other consumers ( 5 ). Resource allocation of antibiotic effectiveness is analogous to the management of fisheries: a fisherman, acting to maximize personal profits, can overfish and diminish the future stock (or quantity) of fish for all other fishermen of the same fish stock.
A fishery, like antibiotic effectiveness, is a common property resource. A common property resource, using fisheries as an example, is usually managed by some collective organization to restrict the quantity of fish harvested and monitor the health of the fishery to sustain a viable fish population in future years. Economists help design resource allocation mechanisms for common property resources that provide incentives (regulations, taxes, or subsidies) for individual agents to act in the interest of the whole collective. These incentives act like prices in that they provide the "feedback" about the values of the resources being used. To design a resource allocation mechanism for antibiotic effectiveness will necessitate much more information about the epidemiology and microbiology of biologic resistance and the trade-offs clinicians face in treatment decisions.
Resource Allocation in Infection Control.
The production function presented here is a simple relationship involving a single variable input. However, most production processes involve many variables, and determining the shape of a multidimensional production function can be a complicated statistical problem. However, understanding the technical relationship between health-care inputs (e. g., provider time, resources actually used for infection control) and outputs (i. e., patient health outcomes), and learning where resources are being over-employed (with no real gains in output) is crucial in determining efficiency and therefore savings in production costs. Hospital infection control is an input to all the productive services a hospital provides (e. g., pediatric care, general surgery, trauma, cancer). Changes in infection control may influence health outcomes throughout the hospital, in ways that may not be obvious.
الاستنتاجات.
Efficiency in resource use (getting the most out of limited resources) is a goal that every health-care organization can accept, regardless of one's perspective (e. g., that of society, insurers, hospital administrators, or patients). Economic analysis is fundamentally about resource use and can serve an important role in health-care decision-making. Applying economic thinking to health care presents challenges to researchers and will require new approaches to analysis. Measuring the productive process in hospital care is complicated by the fact that the patient is both an input and an output in the process (i. e., the patient's health is a function of factors determined outside the hospital, such as lifestyle and genetics). Precise and accurate information from hospital epidemiology is critical to understanding the resources needed, and thus the economic impact, of caring for hospitalized patients.
Dr. Scott is a Steven M. Teutsch Post-Doctoral Fellow in prevention effectiveness methods, Division of Healthcare Quality Promotion, CDC. His areas of research include economic analysis of infectious disease prevention programs and the economic impacts of health care-acquired infections and antibiotic resistance.
المراجع.
¹A complicating factor omitted from the discussion is time. In a longer view of time, all fixed inputs are considered variable and can be redeployed to some other productive process. Therefore, fixed costs must be covered in the long run. Since fixed costs are 'sunk" costs (spent before production even begins), it makes sense to keep operating for short time periods (as opposed to shutting down all production) if variable costs are covered.
Please use the form below to submit correspondence to the authors or contact them at the following address:
Douglas Scott, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Mailstop A07, 1600 Clifton Road, Atlanta, GA 30333, USA; fax: 404-371-5078.
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